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Albania is the only communist country
where religion was completely banned
(in 1967) and which was proclaimed
“atheistic” by the 1976 constitution.
After the disintegration of the commu-
nist system and the abolishment of the
old restrictions on religious freedom in
1990, the religious communities at-
tempted to reconstruct their institu-
tions and religious life. They have en-
countered serious resource problems,
however, as the state has been too
slow to pass new legislation which guarantees the restitution of prop-
erty of the various religious communities previously confiscated by
communists. Consequently, all the religious communities depend
heavily on foreign aid.
The two Muslim communities
The Sunni community reconstituted itself in February 1991 under the
leadership of Hafiz Sabri Koci (who had been persecuted by the Hoxha
regime for his beliefs and spent 23 years in prison), and Sali Tivari.1
They immediately established contacts with Islamic countries and or-
ganizations in order to receive the badly needed spiritual and material
support. Important steps taken were the contract signed in 1991 for
the country’s membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference
(which was however never ratified by Parliament because of a wave of
strong criticism in the press, and the public debates about the geopo-
litical orientation of the country), as well as the establishment of the Is-
lamic Development Bank in 1995. With foreign aid, Muslims built or re-
built hundreds of mosques and opened ten religious schools. The sup-
port, coming mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, Turkey,
and Malaysia, also provided religious literature, funds for the pilgrim-
age to Mecca, and scholarships for the study of Albanian students in
Islamic Institutes abroad. The Sunni
community started several newspa-
pers and established various associa-
tions. In 1996 the Albanian Institute of
Islamic Thought and Civilisation was
created under the directorship of
Ramiz Zekaj. The institute focuses
mainly on academic research and pub-
lications and plays an important role
for the promotion of a “moderate” type
of Islam with strong nationalistic con-
notations. In this respect the organiza-
tion fits into the trend towards an “Albanized” Islam that has been
strong since the late nineteenth century. Zekaj does not see a contra-
diction in the relation between the universal umma and the ethnic
identification “… because the idea of the umma is promoted ideologi-
cally and not in terms of a state. We have a more important task—to
define our national identity … The national cause is above all.”2
Yet the Sunni Muslim community in Albania is far from united. Gen-
erally, it is divided into the followers of more nationalistically oriented
tendencies and partisans of the idea of a pan-Islamic unity. This dis-
pute seems to be, to a certain extent, an intergenerational conflict as
the latter trend is represented mainly by younger Muslims who have
studied in Islamic educational centres abroad. One should, however,
not ignore the strong secular mood in Albania, in particular among in-
tellectuals. Some of them, among whom is the renowned novelist Is-
mail Kadare, highly critical of Islam, even argue that Albania’s Muslims,
should return to their “original faith,” Christianity, as a condition for
their country’s democratic development and reintegration in Europe.3
The much smaller Bektashi community has also struggled to rebuild
its religious life after the collapse of the communist regime, but in their
case foreign support has been limited, coming mainly from Iran. Only a
few of the old tekkes (community houses) have been reopened. More-
over, the issue of communal leadership
and its reproduction seems to be unre-
solved as yet.
One of the main religious issues in Al-
bania concerns the relations between
the Sunni and Bektashi communities.
The debate about the relationship
dates to the time before World War II,
and continues today in one form or an-
other, for example, in the internal dis-
pute between the official Bektashi
leader Baba Reshat Bardhi and the
head of the tekke of Fushë-Krujë, Baba
Selim. Only a few define Bektashiyya as
a dervish order within the Sunni Islam;
the vast majority of Bektashis treasure
their independence from the Sunni
community.4 People from both com-
munities sometimes (but not always)
perceive the distinction as more than
intra-religious. Among representatives
of the Sunni community the statement
“We are Muslims and they are Bek-
tashis” is not uncommon. Bektashiyya
has often featured itself as “a different
Islam” and even as a specifically “Alban-
ian religion” and has played a consider-
able role in the nineteenth century con-






Albania is the only European country with a majority
Muslim population—about 70 % of a total of 3,2 million
and a Christian minority—approximately 20% belong to
the Orthodox Church and 10% to the Roman Catholic
Church. The Muslim population is further divided into a
Sunni community (comprising about 55% of the whole
population), a Bektashi community (about 15%), in
addition to a number of Sufi brotherhoods such as
Rifa‘iyya, Qadiriyya, Khalwatiyya, among others, most of
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Islam has lost some of the influence and popularity it gained immedi-
ately after the fall of the communist regime. The numerous mosques
are hardly crowded with worshippers and some surveys have even in-
dicated that the percentage of atheists among Albanians of Muslim
background is higher than that among those of Orthodox or Roman
Catholic tradition.5 The repression of what is defined as Islamic funda-
mentalism has intensified after 1997. A number of Arab Muslim ac-
tivists and some NGOs have been banned from the country. The rea-
sons behind the altering perceptions of Islam are connected to
changes in the international situation after 9/11, on the one hand, and
to the country’s struggle to “move closer to Europe,” “Europe” being
identified as Christian, on the other hand. 
The discourse of the European Union has become an essential part of
the Albanian national discourse today. Despite the fact that Albania
has not yet started negotiations for a future membership of the EU, the
aspired membership is seen by and large as a panacea against the
country’s enormous problems connected to regional insecurity, mass
poverty, widespread criminality, weak civic order, and the lack of de-
mocratic traditions. Moreover, this future union
with the European mainland is often perceived as
a solution to the unsettled “national question” as
well, providing a “natural” and peaceful unifica-
tion of all Albanians (major Albanian communi-
ties being in Albania proper, Kosovo, Macedonia,
and Montenegro) in the framework of the EU.
Also for this reason Muslims in Albania emphasize
that they are actually “European Muslims.”
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Islam, society and politics
After the collapse of communism the state opted to have no proclaimed
official religion, following the traditional approach which considers Alba-
nia to be a “country of three religions” rather than a Muslim state. Accord-
ing to the Constitution of 1998, there is no official religion and all religions
are equal, yet the four predominant religious communities—that is, in-
cluding the Bektashis as a separate community—enjoy a de facto recogni-
tion and privileged social status because of their historical presence. 
The relations between the various communities are generally re-
laxed. This tolerance is related to the long history of multi-confession-
alism and the traditional pragmatic attitude of the Albanians to reli-
gion, on the one hand, and to the considerable extent of the seculari-
sation of society as a result of communist repression, on the other.
Most Albanians consider their national identity of greater importance
than their religious identification. Religious differences have never pre-
vented collaboration in the name of “national interests,” and cases of
interfaith unions for the defence of autonomy are abundant through-
out Albanian history. Ethno-national identity in Albania has thus pro-
vided an overarching and almost sacred canopy, which has down-
played, or powerfully refocused, identifications along religious lines.
The role of religion in society, while not negligible, is not to be over-
stated. Sometimes Albanians refer to an alleged “pro-Muslim” orienta-
tion of the opposition Democratic Party (in power until 1997) and tend
to see the politics of the ruling Socialist Party as “pro-Orthodox.” These
claims are obviously connected to the Orthodox affiliation of the pre-
sent prime-minister Fatos Nano and that of the president Alfred Moi-
siu, as well as to the correct observation that the electorate of the De-
mocratic Party comes predominantly from the Sunni Muslim commu-
nity (but also from Albanians belonging to the Roman Catholic tradi-
tion), while that of the Socialist party—from the Orthodox and the Bek-
tashi communities. In addition, the Socialist Party has pursued a na-
tionalist orientation bringing the country closer to Greece and Mace-
donia, rather than to the Muslim states. 
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